R - Mr. Fisher Howe

August 30, 1951

OIR - Charles C. Stelle

EO discussion of Psychological Warfare

The difficulty in defining Psychological Warfare which we ensountered in the EG, and which you had encountered in the PSH, seems to me to arise from a confusion between the objectives and the means of PW. There was essentially general agreement that the objectives of PW are to influence the minds and emptions of both friends and ensuies in the interest of the velfare and security of the people of the United States. These objectives are edvicusly identical with the broadest objectives of our national foreign policy. Along the line of edjectives, therefore, there can be no differentiation of PW from pelitical, economic, or military programs.

The real difficulty arises when one attempts to define the means of PW. One school appears to argue that anything done to centribute to the objectives of PW is by that very fact PW and under this argument every political, economic, or military act is subsumed under PW. Others argue that heretofore foreign policy has been largely a matter of dealings between governments and that to the degree that we now begin pursuing our objectives by attempting to deal with foreign individuals we embark on PW. Others state that the techniques of white and black propagants are the whole of PW. It is probably in an analysis of the means of PW that there lies a pessibility for constructive delines than of what we are talking about.

From the intelligence point of view, however, we do not need to wait upon turns of reference which depend on precise definition of what are and what are not properly considered as means of PW. We can begin with the generally agreed objective of influencing the minds and emetions of both friends and emedies, and proceed from that to the generally agreed hypothesis that the general way in which this is accomplished is by playing upon the aspirations and fears of both our friends and our enemies. The intelligence task then becomes fairly clear.

We must:

(1) Estimate the common and variable aspirations and fears of the peoples of the Free *axid (excluding the US).

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- (2) Estimate the openou and variable aspirations and fears of the peoples of the Soviet orbit.
- (3) Estimate the ameets and liabilities which the USSR has for exploiting the aspirations and fears of the peoples of the Pres. World, and the manner and success of this exploitation.

In the light of these three estimates it then becomes the policy task to:

- (1) Estimate those aspiret was or fears which from the standpoint of general US policy it would be best for us to exploit in what areas.
- (2) Determine the methods and techniques of FW which we should employ.

As you know, we are proceeding with the intelligence part of the task.

"I bit will. My share

OIR:CharlesCStelle:rjm:8-30-51

The basic task of Fanel B is to isolate those statements or olivewhich are inadequately supported by specific plans for psychologic L operations.

paychological operations only by spelling the policy out in terms of the impact which that policy will have on the minds and emotions of the people of that area. A psychological plan in support of the policy will set forth ways and means to influence attitudes and emotions of it eight peoples so that they would be disposed actively to accept on at he st passively to accurate in the policy.

Therefore intelligence must play an essential role in white to identify the policies which need further spelling out for H purple es or to indicate gaps where no policy exists for the guidance of Toperators when they are faced with problems or opportunities arising from foreign attitudes.

Intelligence support in this enterprise therefore welli deat ibe the basic aspirations and fears of the peoples of the nost dratical areas of the free world and, separately, of the peoples behind had from Curtain. Intelligence would also identify and describe the mans (including an estimate of the strengths and weaknesses of these and had available to THE USER for exploiting the aspirations and fears of soth the peoples of the Free World and the peoples within its political and military control.

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Against this background of the basic attitudes and emotions of foreign peoples, and of the capabilities of the USSR to mole them, it should then be possible to formulate plans for psychological operations where we are implement US policy and to select the most/ appropriate methods and techniques for influencing foreign attitudes and emotions an directions favorable to our sime.

OIR, therefore, has undertaken two intelligence studies to sup ort the work of Panel B:

- 1. An estimate of the common and conflicting aspirations and fears of the peoples of the Free World.
- 2. An estimate of the common and conflicting aspirations and fears of the peoples of the Soviet Orbit.

Since the psychological planner must be aware of the competition he faces from the enemy, each of the above two papers will include a estimate of the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet propagand apparatus (domestic and foreign) for exploiting the aspirations and each enemy early of peoples in both the Free world and the orbit.

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Problem

What are the common and variable aspirations and fears or the peoples of the Seviet Union?

- I. Common assirations and fears of the peoples of the Soviet & ion.
 - A. Common aspirations and fears
 - 1. Pence (feer of wer)
 - 2. Soonemic welfare (disstisfaction with standard of 1 ving
 - 3. Limitations on governmental controls (fear of coers ve armus)
 - B. Now the Fowlet Government seeks to impede or sandably the sandably or exploit these fears.
 - 1. Persuasion (control of information, incentive erard , att.
 - 2. Coeraion (police, laws and regulations, administrative punishments, throats, etc.)
 - C. Efficacy of the Government's efforts
 - 1. Evidence of resistance groups
 - 2. Evidence of active opposition to the regime by individuo:
 - 3. Evidence of passive opposition to the regimes by it living and
 - 4. Evidence of support for the regime.
- II. Aspirations and fears of particular groups within the Sovie : The see

Within each group (a) what are the common aspirations and real squarement suck to handle them (c) shad a the efficacy of the government's efforts.

- A. Power groups
 - 1. Polithero
 - 2. Party and Government apparatus

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- 3. Military
- 4. Pelice
- 5. Managerial.
- B. Social and economic groups
 - 1. Peasents
 - 2. Norkers
 - 3. Intel igentale
- C. Age and sex groups
 - 1. Youth
 - 2. Women
- D. National groups
 - 1. Ukrainiens
 - 2. Baltic peoples
 - 3. Central Asian peoples
 - 4. Other national minorities

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PROBLEM

What are the common and variable aspirations and fears of the peoples of the free world?

I. Common aspirations and fears of the peoples of the free world.

- 1. Peace
- 2. Security from external aggression.
- 3. Political independence and status.
- 4. Beconomic welfare and independence.
- 5. Governments responsive to the citizenry and useful for achievement of their sime.
- 6. Development and preservation of autonomous cultures.

II. Aspirations and feers of particular areas within the free world.

- 1. Western Europe
- 2. The Far East
- 3. Near East Africa, South Asia
- 4. Latin America

III. Conflicts and Drives

- 1. To what extent are these aspirations and fears channeled by existing US and other Western policies, into drives that support US aims?
- 2. To what extent are these aspirations and fears so affected by entireding US and other Western policies, and so exacerbated by Soviet payable logical warfare, as to create conflicts between US and three world attitudes which can be exploited by the USSR?

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